The final report of the Grenfell Inquiry outlines significant failings by the government and private sector, contributing to the tragedy in 2017. It highlights warnings from as far back as 1992 about the dangers of flammable cladding, which were ignored, leading to 72 deaths.
Government Failures
Multiple governments ignored expert warnings about cladding risks for 25 years. Key decisions were delayed or dismissed due to deregulation policies aimed at cutting "red tape."
Industry Misconduct
The report reveals systematic dishonesty from manufacturers like Arconic, Celotex, and Kingspan, who concealed critical fire safety risks. The Building Research Establishment (BRE), a once-reliable body for construction safety, was privatized in 1997, making it susceptible to manipulation by unscrupulous manufacturers.
Council and Contractor Mismanagement
The Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organisation (TMO), responsible for managing Grenfell Tower, showed indifference to fire safety during the building's refurbishment. The inquiry described a "breakdown of trust" between the TMO and residents, along with contractors like Studio E and Rydon, who failed to address fire risks properly. A "merry-go-round of buck-passing" contributed to systemic failings in the safety responsibilities.
Fire Safety Response Failures
The London Fire Brigade (LFB) had been aware of the challenges posed by high-rise fires since 2009 but did not adequately train or prepare teams for such scenarios. The inquiry criticized the LFB for its complacency and poor leadership, which left firefighters unprepared to handle the Grenfell blaze effectively.
Conclusion: Systemic Failures
The Grenfell disaster is attributed to decades of systemic failures, with the report calling for significant reforms. It recommends establishing a single regulator accountable to the government to oversee building safety and ensure accountability across the sector.
The report represents a critical moment in addressing safety regulations. To read the full report please click here.